Elphinstone PhD Scholarship in Epistemology of Perception at the University of Aberdeen

Job List: 
Europe
Name of institution: 
University of Aberdeen
Town: 
Aberdeen
Country: 
United Kingdom
Job Description: 

One Elphinstone PhD Scholarship in Epistemology of Perception is available at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Aberdeen. The Scholarship covers the entirety of tuition fees for a PhD student of any nationality commencing full-time study in October 2015, for the three-year duration of their studies.

The successful PhD student will be supervised by Dr Luca Moretti (main supervisor http://lucamoretti.org) and Dr Fed Luzzi (associate supervisor).

The applicant should select one of the following research projects:

1) Topics in Epistemology of Perception

Epistemology of perception investigates whether and how we acquire knowledge or justified belief through perception. These important questions are interwoven with a number of issues and problems hotly debated in current epistemology. Here are examples: perceptual scepticism (whether we actually know the external world through perception); basic knowledge or justification (whether perception can provide us with knowledge or justified belief even if its reliability is unwarranted); perceptual dogmatism (according to which, roughly, perceptual appearances are sources of basic justification); cognitive penetration (the awkward phenomenon that appearances’ contents somewhat depends on background mental states); epistemic entitlement theories (according to which we have non-evidential epistemic justification for accepting empirical propositions of certain types). A PhD thesis should focus on one of these issues or a combination of them (e.g. dogmatism and cognitive penetration; or epistemic entitlement and perceptual scepticism) and contribute original research results to the relevant debate.

2) Liberalism versus Conservatism in Epistemology of Perception

According to liberalism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire prima facie justification for believing that P that doesn’t require independent justification for taking your experience to be reliable. Conservatism, on the other hand, states that you have justification for believing that P, when you experience as if P, only if you possess independent justification for taking your experience to be reliable. In current epistemology of perception, Jim Pryor for instance defends liberalism by appealing to perceptual dogmatism. Crispin Wright endorses conservatism by adducing his epistemic entitlement theory to explain why we have independent justification for taking our experience to be trustworthy. Conservatism and liberalism have different merits and problems. For example, liberalism offers a neat response to perceptual scepticism but seems to yield "easy" justification, looks incoherent with Bayesian reasoning, and is threatened by the awkward phenomenon of cognitive penetration. Conservatism is not affected by these difficulties but engenders scepticism unless a credible explanation of why we have independent justification for taking experiences to be reliable is provided. A PhD thesis should analyse this important debate and contribute original research outcomes to the conversation on this topic.

3) Epistemological Disjunctivism in Epistemology of Perception

The defining thesis of epistemological disjunctivism in philosophy of perception roughly says that only the cases of veridical perception can provide us with justification for our perceptual beliefs that is strong enough to ground perceptual knowledge. This type of epistemological disjunctivism is very often based on direct (or naïve) realism––i.e. the view that whereas veridical perceptions have mind-independent objects among their constituents, subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations have just mind-dependent objects as their constituents. Epistemological disjunctivism has been claimed to be able to avoid the threat of perceptual scepticism (e.g. by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard) and reconcile epistemological internalism with externalism (e.g. by Duncan Prichard). These claims and the very defining thesis of epistemological disjunctivism are controversial. A PhD thesis should analyse this important debate and contribute original research findings to the conversation on this topic.

To apply for an Elphinstone PhD Scholarship, you should apply for a PhD via our online system (http://www.abdn.ac.uk/study/postgraduate/apply.php) stating:

- "Elphinstone PhD Scholarship" in the Intended Source of Funding section
- The name of the main supervisor in the Name of Proposed Supervisor section
- The title of the specific research project in the Outline Summary section
- Candidates should simultaneously register their desire to be considered by emailing the Graduate School Administrator, Ann Marie Johnston, at a [dot] m [dot] johnston [__at__] abdn [dot] ac [dot] uk

Eligibility for an Elphinstone Scholarship is based on academic excellence. Applicants must have the equivalent to a UK 1st class or an Upper Second (2.1) Honours undergraduate degree and/or a Masters with Commendation/Merit or Distinction.

Deadline for Applications: 
April 30, 2015
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